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#realy progress report: thanks to the helpful code review of nostr:nprofile1qyghwumn8ghj7mn0wd68ytnhd9hx2tcprdmhxue69uhhg6r9vehhyetnwshxummnw3erztnrdakj7qgkwaehxw309ahx7um5wfjkc6t5v4ejummjvuhsz8rhwden5te0vejk2ern9ehx7um5wghxyctwvshkzatyd9hszythwden5te0xy6rqtnxxaazu6t09uq3vamnwvaz7t69v3jkutnwdaehgu3wd3skuep0qyt8wumn8ghj7mtvv44h2tnjv4skc7fwd3hkctcprpmhxue69uhkzapwdehhxarjwahhy6mn9e3k7mf0qyghwumn8ghj7nn0wd68ytnhd9hx2tcqypcpygfgyuaacpa0n0nhyha9cj7qls2xse47cwx5gdsdcj7xesvtjqzauug i stumbled on some serious errors in handling delete events that have now been fixed it was allowing post dated events to delete, for users to delete other users events, the deletion of delete events, and the a-tag replaceable events selector touching non-parameterised replaceables, and a few other naughty things all fixed now oh yeah, and most importantly it prevents owners from accidentally deleting their own follow and mute lists, which are critical for maintaining the access control list on realy it already correctly handles replaceable events, i did make a small fix with that so that if an error occurs during saving a replaceable event, it does not delete the old one, was a very simple fix, just defers the delete to after the save, and doesn't do the delete if it gets an error from the save, this should prevent any possible race conditions, pretty much mainly just the relay dying exactly between saving the event and deleting the old event it already would only return the newest of a replaceable type, anyway, this just prevents a rare non-atomic replacement from ever occurring

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that is a long way of saying "move the decryption into the signer" and make the signer the message viewer i think that's possible but the idea that clients are spying on you to that level where the previous situation was the clients were entrusted with the key to do all that autonomously... there is a big difference between unlocking your entire inbox forever, and granting access to read TO SHOW you your messages the phobia i seem to be facing is that... now that most clients use detached signers, they are afraid that their apps are handling more secrets that you wrap in the encryption it's silly, they just seem to be trying to unconsciously argue for them to not do a small bit of extra work - ie, make DMs work reliably nostr:nprofile1qyw8wumn8ghj76r0v3kxymmy9e3k7unpvdkx2tn5dahkcue0qy88wumn8ghj7mn0wvhxcmmv9uq32amnwvaz7tmjv4kxz7fwv3sk6atn9e5k7tcpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wd68ytnzv9hxgtcpz4mhxue69uhkg6t5w3hjuur4vghhyetvv9usz9mhwden5te0v96xcctn9ehx7um5wghxcctwvshszgrhwden5te0v9cxcctrv45kuargv4eh2m3wdehhxarjxyhxxmmd9uq3kamnwvaz7tmxv4jkguewdehhxarj9e3xzmny9a6x7mneqyshwumn8ghj7en9v4j8xtnwdaehgu3wvfskuep0w3uhqetnvdexjur5qqsf03c2gsmx5ef4c9zmxvlew04gdh7u94afnknp33qvv3c94kvwxgs4gzkmk and his #coracle (and i think his other apps use this stuff too) are the only clients aside from blowater's 0xtr messenger are the only nostr apps that are even trying nostr:nprofile1qyv8wumn8ghj7enfd36x2u3wdehhxarj9emkjmn99uq3zamnwvaz7tmwdaehgu3wwa5kuef0qythwumn8ghj76twvfhhstnwdaehgu3wwa5kuef0qyv8wumn8ghj7cm9d3kxzu3wdehhxarj9emkjmn99uq3samnwvaz7tmrwfjkzarj9ehx7um5wgh8w6twv5hsz9nhwden5te0v96hg6pwdehhxarjxyhxxmmd9uq3wamnwvaz7tmjv4kxz7fwdehhxarj9e3xzmny9uq3camnwvaz7tmrdpexjum5wp5kcmpwdehhxarjxyhxxmmd9uqzq0vy9tlv6h3f8u5tvcnexdcy50acec2n42ga0y9tz8m2w5k5ffpd4fh76v from nostr.wine has basically given up on trying to get sanity around auth and DMs, most clients now finally support DMs... two years later, i don't think the client devs really understand how fucking retarded they have been the whole time about this, acting like implementing these features was undermining the protocol, when in fact, not implementing them is undermining the viability of the protocol

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